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PERSPECTIVES
International Financial Institutions Face
the Corruption Eruption:1
If the IFIs Put Their Muscle and Money
Where Their Mouth Is, the Corruption
Eruption May Be Capped
James P. Wesberry, Jr.*
[L]et's not mince words: we need to deal with the cancer of corruption.
In country after country, it is the people who are demanding action on
this issue. They know that corruption diverts resources from the poor
to the rich, increases the cost of running businesses, distorts public ex-
penditures, and deters foreign investors. They also know that it erodes
the constituency for aid programs and humanitarian relief. And we all
know that it is a major barrier to sound and equitable development....
Let me emphasize that the Bank Group will not tolerate corruption in
Director since August 1997 of the USAID-financed Americas' Accountability/Anti-
Corruption Project administered by Casals & Associates of Arlington, Virginia. In addition
to being a Certified Public Accountant, Mr. Wesberry is a Certified Fraud Examiner, Certi-
fied Internal Auditor, Certified Financial Services Auditor and Certified Government Finan-
cial Manager. Previously, while at the World Bank, he served on its Corruption Action Plan
Working Group and was the lead staff member in anti-corruption efforts in the Latin Ameri-
can and Caribbean Region.
"Corruption eruption" is a popular term to describe the present upsurge of corruption
throughout the world apparently first used by Mois~s Naim, in Mois~s Naim, The Corrup-
tion Eruption, BROWN J. WoRLD ArE., Summer 1995, at 245.
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the programs that we support; and we are taking steps to ensure that our
own activities continue to meet the highest standards of probity.
James D. Wolfensohn, President of the World Bank2
I. INTRODUCTION
Two unusual, but similar, events occurred almost simultaneously in
Geneva and Washington during the past year. An alleged criminal act by an
international civil servant was disclosed publicly and prosecuted by the In-
ternational Financing Institutions (IFIs)3 involved. In Washington it was a
regional budget officer who embezzled funds from the World Bank.4 In
Geneva it was an accountant who stole from the United Nations Conference
on Trade and Development (UNCTAD).
Only a little over a year ago employees of the IFIs dared not even utter
the word "corruption." Today, that seems to be all they can talk about.
From the end of World War II to almost the end of this century, IFIs main-
tained a "three-monkey policy" toward corruption-they did not see it, they
did not hear of it, and they never, never spoke of it--except perhaps in
hushed code words like "rent seeking."
For over fifty years if corruption was suspected or known, IFIs brushed
it under the rug. Policies and practices were exactly the opposite of the
above quoted statement of World Bank President Wolfensohn. Whitewash
was the name of the game and it was applied with a broad brush.. .until the
corruption eruption across the globe, even within the IFIs and their projects.
Corruption in the governments of emerging democracies became pervasive.
The public sector was largely discredited and the entire concept of govern-
ance based upon communal ownership and government control was jetti-
soned. In parallel, white-collar crime against business skyrocketed and
collusive business practices carried out for selfish gain captured the head-
lines, as banking and financial institutions crashed, humiliating, among oth-
2Los Angeles Times syndicated column distributed November 8, 1997. (on file with the
author)
3 International Financing Institutions, for purposes of this article, are deemed to include
all international and bilateral organizations that finance development activities or projects
through loans, grants or otherwise.
4 Albert B. Crenshaw, World Bank Dismisses Employee In Alleged Embezzlement
Scheme, WASH. PosT. Aug. 21, 1996, at F3. The incident was also the subject of a memo-
randum to all World Bank staff disclosing the incident as an unacceptable occurrence that
would be prosecuted. Over several years, a employee took advantage of her post to appro-
priate travel funds for trips not taken. Previously such cases were not publicized internally
or externally, nor were they normally prosecuted.
5 U.N. Official Given 18 Months Suspended for Embezzlement, Assoc. Press Rep., Sept.
25, 1997, available in 1997 WL4885130. The Associated Press reported the sentencing of
an UNCTAD employee charged with 59 fraud and 49 forgery offenses resulting in the em-
bezzlement over 10 years of more than $500,000 by organizing fictitious meetings and pock-
eting the allowances due the non-existent participants. This was reported as the "first case of
its kind." Id.
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ers, their lawyers and their auditors. The private sector launched efforts to
strengthen internal controls. Even so the corruption eruption continued.6
As it did citizens reacted even more strongly to reject it and anti-corruption
organizations and efforts began to erupt as well.
Many civil society groups, popularly termed "Non-Governmental Or-
ganizations" (NGOs) are entering the anti-corruption battle and new spe-
cialized anti-corruption NGOs are being formed daily.7 Meanwhile existing
professional organizations and civic groups are mounting their own efforts.
Citizen reaction and increasing activism forced governments to react as
well. In the past few years, powerful politicians have fallen world-wide and
have even been forced from office, as the result of citizen-backed official
actions by governments. This has occurred in countries where corruption
had been considered a way of life, a part of the culture that could not be
changed. Today, anti-corruption commissions or specialized agencies un-
der other names are being set up by governments, primarily to ward off irate
citizen activists, and existing agencies such as Attorneys General and
Auditors General are being strengthened. We now have two great forces
engaged in combat: the corruption eruption vs. the anti-corruption reaction,
surging like twin hurricanes, swirling in opposite directions across the
planet and touching down in nearly every country.
In the midst of such a situation, IFIs could not continue the three-
monkey policy. They did not give it up cheerfully, however, and only time
will tell whether they will really contribute to the fight against the corrup-
tion eruption or will merely talk about it while avoiding real participation.
This article addresses what IFIs are doing, are not doing, and hopefully
might do to help cap the corruption eruption sweeping our world. The arti-
6 The author rejects the suggestion, often raised when corruption is discussed, that there
has been no real increase in corruption, that the present phenomena result from an increase in
the publicity given to corrupt acts due to modem media techniques and technology, resulting
in the proliferation of news stories about corruption, in effect an eruption of publicity about,
and interest in, corruption but not of corruption itself.
7 Transparency International (TI), based in Berlin, has become the best known global
NGO, primarily due to its annual release of the Corruption Perception Index that ranks many
countries according to the perceived comparative degree of corruption. TI claims to have
over 70 national chapters in operation across the world. For more information on TI, see
<http://www.transparency.de.html>. Many other existing and new NGOs are announcing
their entry into the anti-corruption arena. Some are expanding existing activities, while oth-
ers are being formed solely to fight corruption.
8 While working for USAID, the author was project manager of a project funded by
USAID and undertaken by one of the first professional groups to enter the fray, the Inter-
American Accounting Association (IAAA). The IAAA declared 1990 as "The Year of
Combat Against Corruption" and, during that year, distributed 30,000 wall posters and
10,000 books, held seminars and otherwise focused attention on corruption among its 28
professional accountancy organizations in 22 countries. In addition, the International Fed-
eration of Accountants on March 29, 1996 announced the formation of an anti-corruption
task force. See Inter-American Convention Against Corruption, Mar. 29, 1996, Organization
of American States, 35 I.L.M. 724 (1996).
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cle primarily relates the efforts of the World Bank in this area and briefly
discusses efforts by other major IFIs.
II. THE WORLD BANK BREAKS THE ICE
President James Wolfensohn's speech opening the October 1996
World Bank/IMF Annual Meetings uncorked the anti-corruption reaction
among the IFIs. He buried the three-monkey policy as he remonstrated:
[W]e ... need to address transparency, accountability, and institutional
capacity. And let's not mince words: we need to deal with the cancer
of corruption.
In country after country, it is the people who are demanding ac-
tion on this issue. They know that corruption diverts resources from
the poor to the rich, increases the cost of running businesses, distorts
public expenditures, and deters foreign investors. They also know that
it erodes the constituency for aid programs and humanitarian relief.
And we all know that corruption is a major barrier to sound and equita-
ble development.
Solutions ... can only be home-grown. National leaders need to
take a stand. Civil society plays a key role as well. Working with our
partners, the [World] Bank Group will help any of our member coun-
tries to implement national programs that discourage corrupt practices.
And we will support international efforts to fight corruption and to es-
tablish voluntary standards of behavior for corporations and investors
in the industrial world.
The Bank Group cannot intervene in the political affairs of our
member countries. But we can give advice, encouragement and sup-
port to governments that wish to fight corruption and it is these gov-
ernments that, over time, will attract the larger volume of investment....
[T]he Bank Group will not tolerate corruption in programs that we sup-
port; and we are taking steps to ensure that our own activities continue
to meet the highest standards of probity. If we find evidence of cor-
ruption in projects in which we are involved, we will cancel the proj-
ects. But we can encourage and work with the many countries that are
interested in taking anti-corruption measures, through technical and
monetary assistance.9
Since then, IFIs have not been the same. In closing the 1997 World
Bank/vIMF Annuals Meetings in Hong Kong on September 23, 1997
Wolfensohn elated:
I was thrilled with the debate on corruption. I think it is astonishing
that in one year we should have come from being scared to mention the
word to having it as the central theme on the Development Committee
agenda. I do not think that anyone underestimates the difficulty of
eradicating corruption completely. But what is significant is that we
9 James D. Wolfensohn, Accountants and Society: Serving the Public Interest, Address at
the Opening Session of World Bank/IMF Annual Meetings in Washington, DC (Oct. 1,
1996) (text on file with the author).
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are focusing on the corruptors and the corruptees; trying to make cor-
ruption illegal, in fact, criminal.'0
A month later, speaking by interactive video, he told 4,000 CPAs
meeting at their 15th World Congress of Accountants in Paris:
Eighteen months ago I couldn't talk about corruption. Eighteen
months ago I was told that corruption was a political not an economic
issue .... This year in Hong Kong, corruption was a central issue. Why?
Because we know that corruption is detrimental to development.
My bottom line on corruption is simple. Corruption impedes
growth and development and penalizes the poor. If a government is
unwilling to take action despite the fact that the country's development
objectives are undermined by corruption, then the Bank Group must
curtail its level of support to that country.II
Wolfensohn referred to accountants as "the custodians of probity,"
stressed their "moral and ethical responsibility to serve the public interest,"
and cautioned them to help governments institutionalize accountability
mechanisms, assure independent offices of Auditors General, agree on
common global accounting and auditing principles and standards providing
for disclosure and open government. 12 He also urged them to take first
steps against money laundering.13 He now makes similar forceful remarks
before whatever group that he may be addressing.
Immediately after his October 1, 1996 speech, World Bank President
Wolfensohn set up an internal task force called the Corruption Action Plan
Working Group with a mandate to produce an action plan to fight corrup-
tion within three months. A highly-qualified senior staff member of the
Bank, experienced in the public sector, headed this group. Twenty-five
more staff members from different disciplines and backgrounds, working
across the world, composed the group's membership, divided into four sub-
groups. Due to the nature of their work, the members all shared one com-
mon interest, a concern about the risks and problems of corruption. Key
Transparency International officials advised the group as it dealt with nu-
merous drafts of the report, which became considerably shorter as major
sections relating to internal Bank anti-corruption efforts, and an annex con-
taining a staff survey were peeled off for separate internal use.
In typical bureaucratic fashion, it took more than the three months
Wolfensohn had hoped for to produce a result, one which did not really
constitute the action plan he had ordered. But, for the World Bank, which
10 James D. Wolfensohn, Concluding Remarks at the 1997 World Bank/IMF Annual
Meetings in Hong Kong, in World Bank Group, Press Release No. 73, Sept. 23-25, 1997, at
3-4 (on file with the Northwestern Journal of International Law & Business).
"1 James D. Wolfensohn, Accountants and Society: Serving the Public Interest, 3 (Oct.
26, 1997) (Background Paper for Remarks to the World Congress of Accountants) (emphasis
in the original) [hereinafter Accountants and Society] (on file with the Northwestern Journal
of International Law & Business).
12 Id. at4.
13 id.
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had looked the other way from corruption for over fifty years, it was a great
leap forward. The report of the task force, Helping Countries Combat Cor-
ruption: The Role of the World Bank,14 was finally considered and endorsed
by the Bank's Board of Executive Directors on September 2, 1997, in time
to be printed and distributed at the Hong Kong Annual Meeting.
This historic World Bank Anti-Corruption Report envisions four levels
of effort by the Bank to fight corruption:
1. Preventing fraud and corruption in World Bank-financed projects,
obviously the most visible and vulnerable area of concern.
2. Assisting countries fight corruption, if and when they request it.
3. Seriously considering corruption in the World Bank's internal
planning, in the design of its projects and in its analysis and policy
dialogue with countries which lead to agreeing upon strategies.
4. Supporting international efforts against corruption. 15
The Corruption Action Plan Working Group concluded that:
* Corruption is a global problem (it is not limited to developing
countries).
" Sustainable development demands the control of corruption (its so-
cial and economic costs fall disproportionately on the poor).
• Corruption puts political support for aid programs at risk (by un-
dermining the confidence of those who finance aid that it really
works).
* The time has come to address corruption more comprehensively (a
window of opportunity has been opened by worldwide events and
citizen reaction).
* Corruption is a governance issue (which the World Bank can ad-
dress as it relates to economic concerns).
* Tackling corruption is neither easy nor quick (it is a symptom of
deeper seated factors).
* Committed country leadership and support is essential (achieving
and maintaining the political will to combat corruption requires
sustained leadership and support from citizens and civil society).
* The World Bank should address corruption more explicitly (within
its mandate, utilizing its comparative advantage).
* Help can be provided to countries in designing and implementing
their own anti-corruption strategies.
* The World Bank can pay more attention to corruption when de-
signing and assessing economic reforms.
14 THE WORLD BANK, HELPING CoUNTRIEs COMBAT CORRUPTION: THE ROLE OF THE
WORLD BANif, Sept. 1997 [hereinafter ANTI-CoRRUPTION REPORT] (on file with the North-
western Journal of International Law & Business).
15 Id. at3.
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" More emphasis can be put on strengthening public sector manage-
ment and governance.
* Projects supported should set an example of best practice (pro-
curement and disbursement by the World Bank should progres-
sively place more emphasis on borrower accountability).
* The impact of corruption should be raised in the World Bank's
dialogue with borrowers.
" Country assistance strategies and project design should more ex-
plicitly address corruption and its economic effects.
* Knowledge about corruption should be accumulated, disseminated
and applied (by dedicating more resources to understanding the
dynamics of corruption).
* Skill gaps among the World Bank's staff must be filled (especially
in financial management, procurement and public sector manage-
ment).
* Working relations with partners should continually be built and
strengthened (including governments, NGOs and the private sector
at the country level and bilateral donors, other international organi-
zations and NGOs regionally and globally).
* Active partnership should be sought in multilateral efforts to con-
trol corruption and reduce transnational bribery.
16
The following sections attempt to summarize a bit more fully some of
the seventy-three-page report.
III. THE WORLD BANK DEFINES AND ANALYZES CORRUPTION
The "abuse of public office for private gain" constitutes the official
brief definition of corruption presented in the Anti-Corruption Report.
17
The definition is discussed and elaborated upon in a footnote covering al-
most a full page of small type. Further elaboration following the definition
states that:
Public office is abused for private gain when an official accepts, solic-
its, or extorts a bribe. It is also abused when private agents actively of-
fer bribes to circumvent public policies and processes for competitive
advantage and profit. Public office can also be abused for personal
benefit even if no bribery occurs, through patronage and nepotism, the
theft of state assets, or the diversion of state revenues.'
8
The Anti-Corruption Report points out that corruption does not always
involve two persons, nor does it always involve persons from the private as
well as the public sectors, concepts often misunderstood. 19 It does not
16Id. at 4-7.
17Id. at 8.
s Id. at 8-9.
19 See id. at 8-11 (discussing definition and types of corruption). President Wolfensohn
himself (and many others as well) is fond of saying that it takes two to corrupt, that there is
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mince words at times. For example it points out that accountability systems
may become dysfunctional and that the normal "watchdog institutions" of
government (auditors, ombudsmen, the press, and anti-corruption bodies)
are ineffectual or, even worse, politicized. ° It recognizes corruption scales
as varying from "grand" to "petty," based on type or size, as being "politi-
cal" or "bureaucratic" and the occurrence of corruption as being "isolated"
or "systemic." 21 Systemic corruption occurs when formal rules are in place,
but are superseded by informal rules, and corruption may be "pervasive,"
spreading throughout the public sector, or confined to specific locations or
types of transactions.22 The Anti-Corruption Report rejects economic mod-
els, popular some years ago, which held that corruption could have some
positive economic effects, deeming these to be only short run advantages,
which ultimately become costly.23
The World Bank is concerned about corruption for two principal rea-
sons:
* Fiduciary Responsibilities and Image: The need to ensure that the
projects it finances are as free as possible from fraud and corrup-
tion (which would discredit the integrity of lending programs and
undermine that of the Bank itself).24
* Anti-Development Impact: The cost of corruption to borrowing
countries and its negative impact upon their development (thus de-
feating one of the main purposes for the World Bank's exis-
tence) .25
Some of the costs of corruption the World Bank has identified are:
" Diversion of scarce development resources (especially from proj-
ects to alleviate poverty, thus hurting the poor);
* Macroeconomic instability;
always a corruptor and a corruptee, and implying that private sector corruptors may be worse
than public sector corruptees. See Accountants and Society, supra note 11, at 4. This latter
inference inevitably comes up at any seminar or conference on the subject of corruption.
These concepts are, of course, highly incorrect for a number of reasons. Only the corrupt act
of bribery takes two persons and the corruptor may well be the solicitor, not the giver of the
bribe. Many other types of corrupt acts in government are performed by only one person, or
by several persons who work together without involving the private sector, just as many cor-
rupt acts in the private sector do not involve those in government. Inevitably, in these days
of the rejection of the concept of accountability, the exposed corrupted "corruptees" plead
innocence due to the overvhelming presence of the powerful corruptor, harking back to the
flimsy excuses offered by the huma inhabitants of the Biblical Garden of Eden, where Adam
charged Eve with being the corrupter, while she blamed the serpent.20 See ANI-CORRUPTION REPORT, supra note 14, at 13.
21 Id. at 9-10.
22 Id. at 11, 13.
23 Id. at 14-15.24 Id. at 25.
25Id. at 4-5.
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" Deterrence of private investment (especially foreign investment);
" Discrimination against small entrepreneurs;
" Harm to the environment; and,
* Undermining of trust in government and the rule of law.26
IV. BRIBERY
Bribes are a major concern of the World Bank. They can be offered to
gain an advantage or acquire goods, services or other things provided by
governments. They may be sought by government officials in exchange for
supplying such things. Here is how the Anti-Corruption Report classifies
and discusses bribes:
* Government contracts. Bribes can influence the government's
choice of firms to supply goods, services, and works, as well as the
terms of their contracts. Firms may bribe to win a contract or to
ensure that contractual breaches are tolerated.
* Government benefits. Bribes can influence the allocation of gov-
ernment benefits, whether these are monetary benefits (such as
subsidies to enterprises or individuals or access to pensions or un-
employment insurance) or in-kind benefits (such as access to cer-
tain schools, medical care, or stakes in enterprises being
privatized).
* Lower taxes. Bribes can be used to reduce the amount of taxes or
other fees collected by the government from private parties. Such
bribes may be proposed by the tax -collector or the taxpayer. In
many countries the tax bill is negotiable.
* Licenses. Bribes may be demanded or offered for the issuance of
a license that conveys an exclusive right, such as a land develop-
ment concession or the exploitation of a natural resource. Some-
times politicians and bureaucrats deliberately put in place policies
that create control rights, which they profit from by selling.
* Time. Bribes may be offered to speed up the government's
granting of permission to carry out legal activities, such as com-
pany registration or construction permits. Bribes can also be ex-
torted by the threat of inaction or delay.
* Legal outcomes. Bribes can change the outcome of the legal proc-
ess as it applies to private parties, by inducing the government ei-
ther to ignore illegal activities (such as drug dealing or pollution)
or to favor one party over another in court cases or other legal pro-
ceedings.27
Former Auditor General of Canada, Kenneth M. Dye, now head of a
consulting firm, emphasized the threat of bribery to his own firm in a recent
26 id. at 17-19.
27 Id. at 9-10.
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speech to the partners of a prominent Canadian firm of chartered account-
ants that specializes in forensic audit work:
In developing countries, bribery is one of the main tools of corruption
in government. Bribes can be and are used to influence the govern-
ment's choice of suppliers for goods and services as well as to ensure
that contract breaches are tolerated. In our Cowater consulting firm, we
have not been able to negotiate contracts where we have won the tech-
nical proposal competition, but we refused to pay bribes.2s
Benefits acquired by bribery may vary considerably. Very large con-
tracts or other benefits resulting from bribery are considered grand or
wholesale corruption, as compared to small or petty corruption.29 The Anti-
Corruption Report states that "[g]rand corruption is often associated with
international business transactions and usually involves politicians and bu-
reaucrats."30 Bribery does not necessarily take place within the country. It
may be carried out entirely outside the country thus complicating jurisdic-
tional problems and acquisition of evidence.
Petty corruption may be pervasive throughout the public sector so that
almost all licenses or services from the government are expected to be paid
for.31 Often, to share the proceeds, bribes are pooled in elaborate sharing
arrangements among groups such as police or customs officials. 32 Because
of their volume, the aggregate costs of petty corruption, in terms of both
money and economic distortions, may be as great if not greater than those
of grand corruption.u
V. THEFT
Theft of state assets or financial resources by officials charged with
their stewardship is also corruption.34 Often such theft is considered by
public officials to be justified if their salaries are inadequate. In these
situations, accounting and asset control systems are typically weak or non-
existent, as is the institutional capacity to identify and punish wrongdoers.
According to the Anti-Corruption Report, "officials may pocket tax reve-
nues or fees (often with the collusion of the payer, in effect combining theft
with bribery), steal cash from treasuries, extend advances to themselves that
are never repaid, or draw pay for fictitious "ghost" workers, a pattern well
28 Kenneth M. Dye, Navigating Government Corruption Mazes, Address Before the
Lindquist Avery MacDonald Baskerville Inc. Partner's Meeting, Toronto (Dec. 4, 1997) (on
file with the Northwestern Journal of International Law & Business).2 9 ANI.CORUPTION REPORT, supra note 14, at 9.
30 Id.






International Law & Business 18:498 (1998)
documented in the reports of audit authorities. In such cases financial con-
trol systems typically have broken down or are neglected by managers. 3 5
VI. CORRUPTION IN THE PRIVATE SECTOR
Private sector fraud and bribery often have costly results. Unregulated
financial systems permeated with fraud can undermine savings, deter for-
eign investment, and make a country vulnerable to financial crises and mac-
roeconomic instability. Criminal elements may take over entire banks or
other financial institutions for the purpose of wholesale fraud.
A strong corporate focus on profitability does not prevent individual
employees from soliciting bribes from suppliers. When corruption is sys-
temic in the public sector, firms that do business with government agencies
are compelled to either participate in bribery or abstain from dealing with
the government.
The Anti-Corruption Report mentions private sector corruption but its
principal thrust is corruption in the public sector. It states:
Public sector corruption is arguably a more serious problem in devel-
oping countries, and controlling it may be a prerequisite for controlling
private sector corruption. Still, Bank activities can also promote the
control of bribery and fraud in the private sector by helping countries
strengthen the legal framework to support a market economy and by
encouraging the growth of professional bodies that set standards in ar-
eas like accounting and auditing. In the long run, controlling corruption
in the private sector may require improvements in business culture and
ethics.
VII. CAUSES OF CORRUPTION
Some causes of corruption mentioned in the Anti-Corruption Report
are:
" Weak institutions where government policies generate economic
rents.
* Low and declining civil service salaries and promotion uncon-
nected to performance.
* Dysfunctional government budgets.
* Inadequate supplies and equipment.
* Delays in the release of budget funds, especially when this in-
volves pay.
* Loss of organizational purpose.
* Use of public office for private gain by senior officials and politi-
cal leaders.
* Lack of protection for those who resist corruption.
3 5 id.
161d. at 11-12.
International Financial Institutions Face the Corruption Eruption
18:498 (1998)
" A public service long dominated by patron-client relationships, in
which the sharing of bribes and favors has become entrenched.
" Pay levels historically low, with the informal understanding that
staff will find their own ways to supplement inadequate pay.
* Closed political systems dominated by narrow vested interests.
* International sources of corruption associated with major projects
or equipment purchases.
* Weak accountability.
* Eroded ethical values.
* Unenforced rules of conduct and conflict of interest.
* Inoperative financial management systems resulting in no formal
mechanism to hold public officials accountable for results.
* Ineffectual watchdog institutions such as ombudsmen, auditors,
and the media.
* Special anti-corruption bodies turned into partisan instruments
whose real purpose is not to detect fraud and corruption but to har-
ass political opponents.
* a divergence between the formal and the informal rules governing
behavior in the public sector.
The Corruption Action Plan Working Group found that "[w]here cor-
ruption is systemic, the formal rules remain in place, but they are super-
seded by informal rules.. .in practice the anti-corruption law is not enforced
and informal rules prevail."'3, Government anti-corruption mechanisms and
agencies may continue to operate but do not have the intended effect upon
corruption. 8 Instead, they give a sense of false confidence. Emphasis must
be shifted back to the formal rules by strengthening institutions that control
corruption. Thus a strong legal framework to control corruption requires
more than having the right legal rules in place. It requires, according to the
Anti-Corruption Report, "addressing the sources of informality, first by un-
derstanding why the informal rules are at odds with the formal rules and
then by tackling the causes of divergence. 39
VIII. ACTIONS BY THE WORLD BANK
The World Bank's Procurement and Consultant Guidelines were re-
vised to include a section specifically addressing fraud and corruption.40 As
a result, borrowers of Bank loans, and bidders, suppliers, and contractors
under Bank contracts must "observe the highest standards of ethics during
37 Id. at 13.38 id.
39 id.
4 0THE WORLD BANK, GUIDELINES: PROCUREMENT UNDER IBRD LOANS AND IDA
CREDITS, § 1.15 (1995).
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the procurement and execution of such contracts. ' 41 A new section in the
procurement guidelines states that the Bank will reject award proposals if it
determines that the bidder engaged in corrupt or fraudulent practices while
competing for the contract at issue.42 The Bank will also cancel any portion
of a loan allocated to a contract that involved corrupt or fraudulent prac-
tices.43 The section also provides that any firm that has engaged in corrupt
or fraudulent practices while competing for a Bank-financed contract will
be ineligible for future Bank-funded contracts (either indefinitely or for a
stated period of time).44 Moreover, procurement contracts must now in-
clude provisions allowing the Bank to insp ect accounts and records or have
them audited by Bank appointed auditors. 5
In 1997, the World Bank adopted more transparent procedures for se-
lecting consultants. 46 It now requires public advertisement of larger as-
signments, public disclosure of short listed firms and their technical scores,
and public opening of financial proposals.47 The Bank also introduced a
new provision in the Procurement and Consultant Guidelines to allow a "no
bribery pledge" in the bid form, but only at the borrower's request, which
would obligate parties to abide by national fraud and corruption laws in
bidding and executing contracts. Governments seeking such a clause in
World Bank financed contracts would have to satisfy the Bank that such an
understanding would be matched by robust measures by governments to
address the domestic causes of bribery. In addition, the Bank is launching
in-depth surprise procurement audits of certain projects in some countries to
identify weaknesses in the procurement supervision system. Also, the latest
Guideline revisions require the use of Standard Bidding Documents issued
by the Bank.4 9 The Standard Bidding Documents require disclosure of any
commissions and gratuities paid in association with a bid or a contract.
Such documents have a wide impact as, sometimes, borrowing country
governments use them for their own procurement.
The Bank's training arm, the Economic Development Institute (EDI),
has been directing efforts on piloting new approaches to governance, fo-
cusing on accountability and transparency (primarily anti-corruption initia-
tives) and Service Delivery Surveys (SDS) (involving aid-financed surveys
of household attitudes to service delivery, including corruption carried out
41 Id.
421 Id. § 1.15 (b).431 Id. § 1.15 (c).
44 Id. § 1. 15 (d).451Id. § 1.15 (e).
46 THE WORLD BANK, GUIDELINES: PROCUREMENT UNDER IBRD LOANS AND IDA
CREDITS, § 1.15 (1998)47 Id. § 2.7.
41id. § 1.16.
49 Id. § 2.19.
International Financial Institutions Face the Corruption Eruption
18:498 (1998)
on behalf of govemments).s Increasingly, these approaches are being in-
corporated into mainstream World Bank operational work through training
and technical assistance components of country programs. EDI's "National
Integrity" and institutional strengthening programs expanded in 1997 from
Uganda, Tanzania and Jordan, to Ukraine, Bangladesh, Ghana, Benin, Ma-
lawi, Mauritius, Yemen and Gaza. In 1998, similar programs are expected
to extend to Bolivia, Nicaragua and Venezuela.
IX. CORRUPTION IN WORLD BANK FINANCED PROJECTS
There have been many allegations of corruption in projects financed by
the World Bank over the years. Traditionally these allegations have been
denied and whitewashed. For example, on July 27, 1997, an assistant pro-
fessor at Northwestern University, Jeffrey Winters,51 was reported in the
Jakarta press as saying that at least a third of World Bank loans to Indonesia
"leak into the government bureaucracy and disappear." Corruption in Indo-
nesia has been widely publicized over the years, and the country has always
been ranked among the most corrupt countries according to Transparency
International's Corruption Index since the survey began (in fact Indonesia
was considered the most corrupt country in the world in the very first such
ranking).52
As has traditionally been its posture, the Bank immediately issued a
denial of the allegation. The World Bank's Vice-President for East Asia
and the Pacific, Jean-Michel Severino declared:
We know exactly where our money is going. Worldwide we have very
stringent standards for disbursement of our loans. If supervision of our
projects produced any evidence of misappropriation or misallocation of
so See The World Bank Group Economic Development Institute, Regulatory Reform and
Private Enterprise, <http://www.worldbank.org/htmedi/edirp.html#psm> and Governance
and Anti-corruption Program, <http://www.worldbank.orglhtml/edi/gac/gac.htm> (visited
November 14, 1998).
51 Professor Winters is an expert on Indonesia and author of JEFFREY WINTERS, POWER IN
MOTION: CAPITAL MOBILITY IN THE INDONESIAN STATE (1996). Dr. Winters is considered an
authoritative source of information and analysis of the political contribution corruption scan-
dals involving large contributions from Indonesians sources which were brought to light
during the 1996 US presidential campaign. In a lengthy call-in radio show for NPR, on No-
vember 5, 1996 Winters said, "Some of the most wealthy people in the world ...live in places
like Indonesia.. .This money is squeezed out of Indonesia's own population and to some ex-
tent out of the business people as they have to make huge payments.. .One of the biggest
costs (of doing business in Indonesia) is in the incredible payoffs and corruption that go to
the officials in government." Talk of the Nation: What Has Indonesia Gained From Politi-
cal Contributions? (National Public Radio broadcast, Nov. 5, 1996) available in LEXIS,
News Library, Curnws File.52 See Transparency Int'l, Transparency International Publishes 1997 Corruption Per-
ception Index, Press Release, July 3 1, 1997, available at
<http://vww.transparency.de/press/1997.31.7.cpi.html> (visited November 14, 1998).
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our funds, we would take swift action to stop it. We do not tolerate cor-
ruption in our programs. On this principle there is no compromise. 5
Stating that the Bank was puzzled by the allegation, he went on, "We
have checked his claim, which he has made in the past, and found nothing
to support such an estimate. 5 4
The Bank's Resident Representative in Jakarta, Dennis de Tray stated:
It is deeply regrettable that our work for the people of Indonesia should
be misrepresented in this way. The procurement of goods and services
financed under Bank loans is conducted through open, transparent and
competitive international procedures. Funds are disbursed only to sup-
pliers of these goods and services under contracts approved by the
Bank. There is full accountability on the use of Bank funds through a
comprehensive system of independent ex-post financial audits of proj-
ect accounts. The Bank itself carries out separate reviews on the use
and development impact of its loans. 55
For those familiar with the Bank, this approach clearly indicated that at
that time, prior to the issuance of the Anti-Corruption Report, little attention
was actually being paid to Wolfensohn's newly-expressed declarations on
corruption. Anti-corruption authorities know well that where corruption is
taken seriously, allegations of it are also taken seriously, rather than simply
brushed over by a knee-jerk denial. These denials issued so promptly were
considered laughable by those persons who know that the procurement, dis-
bursement, supervision, auditing and review processes cited primarily have
been cosmetic measures which, though printed in operations and policy
manuals, and often repeated in speeches and official pronouncements, were
rarely given high priority. These type of statements by Bank officials are
considered justifiable by some where a country's "dignity" may have been
questioned. Many others, however, strongly feel that this type of "official
cover-up" of corruption over the years by the World Bank and other IFIs
has in fact aided and abetted corruption in government, and especially in
international development projects.
It is only the recent realization of the degree of vulnerability to major
financial losses affecting the stability of countries, and even of entire re-
gions, and the real risk of highly embarrassing scandals that is fueling ef-
forts to face up to the implicit cost of corruption to worldwide development
efforts. Wolfensohn understands this, as do many top officers of the World
Bank and virtually all its lower level staffers. Unfortunately, there are still
a number of upper and midlevel staff members who came up under the old
"three monkey policies" who find it very hard to change. Their attitude
continues to exist in spite of a tremendous effort to create change con-
53 The World Bank Group, Indonesia and the World Bank, Press Release No.
98/1426/EAP, July 28, 1997, available at
<http://www.worldbank.org/html/extdr/extme/1426.htm> (visited November 14, 1998).
54id.
55 id.
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sciousness within the Bank by utilizing the most modem training and moti-
vational techniques.
The Indonesia corruption cover-up was dramatically exposed recently
when, as a result of the Asian financial meltdown, the World Bank Presi-
dent visited Jakarta and was confronted by local community leaders who
criticized the Bank for lending huge sums to the Indonesian government
while ignoring reports of "rampant corruption" and lack of accountability.
The head of the Indonesian think tank, Econit, voiced concerns that errors
made by the Bank such as "insufficiently monitoring the use of its own
funds" had contributed to the economic crisis. Put on the defensive,
Wolfensohn conceded that the Bank "got it wrong" but defended it against
charges that it was guilty of collusion, deceit and shoddy economic report-
ing. He was widely quoted in the press for admitting the Bank made "mis-
takes" in its analysis of Indonesia's problems, and underestimated the
economic impact of pervasive corruption. He was described as "angrily"
rejecting criticism that the Bank had done nothing to tackle corruption tell-
ing reporters he constantly raises the issue in countries around the world. "I
have talked often about corruption and openness. Corruption, where it ex-
ists, is the biggest cancer in terms of development," he stated.56
X. CORRUPTION IN TENDERING FOR GOVERNMENT CONTRACTS
The recurrent anti-corruption rhetoric characteristic of politicians must
be taken with a grain of salt. A rather alarming but typical case of corrup-
tion in tendering for government contracts and concessions was recently re-
ported in Canada. In April 1995, the President of Sri Lanka had spoken to
the Paris Club about the need to clean up corruption. "Yet, only a few
months earlier, her personal protocol secretary had approached an interna-
tional consortium led by Mihaly International Canada Ltd., to propose that
the secretary "represent" the group in dealings with the new Sri Lankan
government on a 300-megawatt electric power project. After the offer was
declined, the government cancelled the contract award. 57  The involved
parties described their experience and reaction by stating that:
56 Summarized from the following news articles of February 5, 1998: Jay Solomon,
World Bank Says It Was Wrong on Indonesia, WALL ST. J., Feb. 5, 1998, at A17; Jay Solo-
mon, World Bank ChiefAdmits to Misjudging Indonesia, WALL ST. J. EuR., Feb. 5, 1998, at
2; Wolfensohn Must Rise to the Occasion, Bus. DAY, Feb. 5, 1998, at 2; World Bank Dis-
bursing $1b to RI this Month, INDONESIAN OBSERVER, Feb. 5, 1998, at 1, as well as from
World Bank Internal News Summaries dated February 4 and 5, 1998 (on file with the
Northwestern Journal of International Law & Business). Wolfensohn was apparently visi-
bly upset. Bangkok's Business Day described Wolfensohn as "evasive and defensive."
Wolfensohn Must Rise to the Occasion, Bus. DAY, Feb. 5, 1998, at 2. He would probably
have been even more upset had someone made him aware that one of his vice presidents had
denied outright corruption in Bank projects in Indonesia just seven months earlier in a formal
Bank press release.
57 See John H. Walker & J. Michael Robinson, Business Ethics: Lenders Must Act on
Corruption, GLOBE & MAIL, Jan. 15, 1998, at B-2. John H. Walker is the "chairman of Mi-
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Such behaviour is all too typical of what goes on in many countries,
where paying for contracts is almost institutionalized. First, the gov-
ernment issues an exclusive letter of intent to a company or consortium
for a project. Often, the job is to be privately financed, constructed and
operated on a "build, own, operate and transfer" method, with the
country taking possession at the end of the concession, say 20 years.
Significant design, engineering, legal and financial advisory expendi-
tures are made. If negotiations with the bid winner go well, the losing
competition plots, with the help of their political and civil service
"friends," to sabotage the project and/or extract unauthorized payments
from its sponsors. If improper payments are refused, problems start oc-
curring: Requests are made for additional capital works, or for a new
rate structure for the product (e.g. tolls for a road, the price for electric-
ity etc.). Anonymous telephone calls are made, proposing that money
be deposited in offshore bank accounts.
The competition, sensing victory, goes into intense lobbying to
enlist the support of individuals close to the administration. Even dip-
lomats are dispatched to make a case for cancellation on behalf of their
national client competitors. Eventually, the project is cancelled, despite
the expenditure in good faith of large sums.
At that point, you can leave gracefully or fight. The consortium
chose to fight. It is demanding arbitration at the World Bank-sponsored
International Centre for Settlement of Investment Disputes in Wash-
ington to recover its costs and losses. 
5
The irate Canadians feel that IFIs must no longer turn a blind eye while
extortion and bribery hurt the prospects of countries in which they are try-
ing to alleviate poverty and misery. They say:
The IFIs - particularly the World Bank, the Asian Development Bank,
the Inter-American Development Bank and the European Bank for Re-
construction and Development - could bring an end to corruption by re-
quiring that all projects in which they are involved be audited and all
parties be accountable. The major commercial bankers of the world
should contribute by not permitting funds transfers from politicians and
civil servants to offshore accounts. But the IFIs are the key. They have
the financial clout. Unless one of them supports a project, other princi-
pal public and private financiers rarely will.
haly International Canada Ltd., an international management consulting and development
firm, and J. Michael Robinson is the director of the international practice group in the To-
ronto law firm Fasken Martineau." Id. In this article, the two authors irately lambast corrupt
practices describing their own experience.58 id.
59 Id. Theoretically, international projects are audited; however, in practice this has tra-
ditionally been a very low priority. Indeed, the usefulness and quality of audit work is ques-
tionable and rarely subject to quality control reviews, audit terms of reference are often
vague, project accounting records often unauditable or poorly maintained, financial reports
are untimely thus making audits even more untimely and auditors resist becoming involved
in matters related to fraud and corruption, nor are they encouraged to do so. Rarely is there
any discipline in the financial reporting and audit process, despite the existence of eloquent
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The Canadian businessmen think that a "top-down" solution involving
the IFIs is needed. They suggest that IFIs close ranks and deny financing to
any project until it is proved to be corruption free. They maintain that this
would stop corruption cold because "when the IFIs turn off their money
taps, other private and public money will not flow." 60
XI. THE INTERNATIONAL MONETARY FUND ISSUES GUIDELINES
While the World Bank, in the person of James Wolfensohn, has been
more loquacious on the subject of corruption, the International Monetary
Fund (IMF) produced the first tangible guidelines to attack corruption. On
August 4, 1997, the IMF Executive Board released guidelines warning that,
"Financial assistance from the IMF.. .could be suspended or delayed on ac-
count of poor governance, if there is reason to believe it could have signifi-
cant macroeconomic implications that threaten the successful
implementation of the program, or if it puts in doubt the purpose and use of
the IMF resources., 61 The Board instructed IMF staff to consider corrup-
tion and accountability issues in its relations with borrowing countries.62
The IMF guidelines are worded in the language of economists, which
makes them difficult to understand for laypersons. The Guidelines do,
however, officially recognize the problem of corruption for the first time.
More importantly, they call the attention of IMF staff to the threat that cor-
ruption poses to international lending for development.
written rules and regulations. Usually, audit arrangements are left to the borrower and the IFI
project manager, parties who lack audit expertise and have vested interests in positive audit
results. The emphasis of project audits generally is upon financial presentation, not value for
money or an assurance that resources are being used for their intended purposes. Units re-
sponsible for audit quality rarely exist in IFIs and where they do, they are severely under-
staffed and are unable to give assurance that audits are serving their intended purposes. In
summary, while audits are statutorily required by IFIs, they are generally innocuous, un-
timely and therefore useless. They furnish IFIs with only cosmetic accountability, not the
kind of accountability that the Canadian businessmen seek.60 Id. The simple solution of turning off the money taps is heresy to an IFI. Speeding up
the flow of money through the pipelines and opening the taps wider is the name of the IFI
game. The suggestion made by Messrs. Walker and Robinson, though terribly logical, goes
against the underlying culture and philosophy of the classic IFI and basically highlights the
internal conflict within the Is where prudence and accountability considerations interfere
with money flow, the lifeblood of the IFI. The problem is compounded for IFIs, as com-
pared to commercial lenders, because there are no free market controls which focus lending
decisions to consider prudence and accountability (though a strong argument could be made
that sovereign lending by commercial lenders likewise has often been free from normal mar-
ket controls, thus causing the cyclical debt crises across the world).
61 EX ECuTIvE BOARD, INTERNATIONAL MONETARY FUND, THE ROLE OF THE IMF IN
GOVERNANCE ISSUES: GUIDANCE NOTE, adopted July 25, 1997, 16 [hereinafter GUIDANCE
NOTE] (on file with the Northwestern Journal of International Law & Business).62 See IMF Takes Lead: Tough Guidelines Attack Corruption, ACcoUNTABiLiTY/ANTI-
CORRUPTION NEWSL. (Special Edition) (USAID Accountability/Anticorruption Project, Ca-
sals & Assoc., Arlington, VA), Sept. 1997, at 1.
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The IMF guidelines specifically seek to provoke greater attention to
involvement in governance 3 issues through "a more proactive approach in
advocating policies and the development of institutions and administrative
systems that aim to eliminate opportunity for rent seeking, corruption, and
fraudulent activity. ' 64 Like the World Bank, the IMF expresses great con-
cern that corruption issues be addressed only based on "economic consid-
erations within its mandate. 6 5 Its guidelines stress that the IMF cannot
"adopt the role of an investigative agency or guardian of financial integrity
in member countries. 66
The IMF Guidance Note served notice publicly and formally that at
last the world's premiere IFI was going to take corruption seriously, and it
beat the World Bank's similar public action, approving its Anti-Corruption
Report, by only thirty-eight days. In fairness, it should be noted that the
Bank had emphasized corruption in its World Development Report 1997:
The State in a Changing World. Once the leading IFIs finally decided to
enter the anti-corruption arena a spirit of friendly competition arose which
has been very fruitful to the entire anti-corruption movement. Both the
Fund and the Bank have xublished a number of documents on corruption
during the past year or so.
XIL ACTION BY THE IMF
Speaking before Transparency International (France) in Paris on Janu-
ary 21, 1998, IMF Managing Director Michael Camdessus answered a
question he himself posed:
63 Governance, the act, process, or power of governing, is a recently unearthed term that
is sufficiently vague as to ensure its enduring popularity in literature prized for lack of speci-
ficity. "Good governance" has become the fodder for abundant literature dealing with al-
most anything deemed laudable in the public or private sector. Governance issues, therefore,
involve anything that might improve the act, process, or power of governing, including anti-
corruption measures.
64 See GUIDANCE NOTE, supra note 61 (quotation from introductory note by Jack Boor-
man, Director, Policy Development and Review Department).61 Id. 16.
6 id.
67 See, e.g. PAULO MAURO, INTERNATIONAL MONETARY FUND, WHY WORRY ABOUT
CORRUPTION (1997); SUSAN ROSE-ACKERMAN, THE WORLD BANK, THE POLITICAL ECONOMY
OF CORRUPTION-CAUSES AND CONSEQUENCES, (1996); and SUSAN ROSE-ACKERMAN, THE
WORLD BANK, REDESIGNING THE STATE TO FIGHT CORRUPTION: TRANSPARENCY,
COMPETITION, AND PRIVATIZATION (1996). In addition, the World Bank's Economic Devel-
opment Institute (EDI) has issued a catalog of its own publications on "integrity." See
PETTER LANGSETH & RICK STAPENHURST, ECONOMIC DEVELOPMENT INSTITUTE OF THE
WORLD BANK, NATIONAL INTEGRITY SYSTEM: COUNTRY STUDIES (1997) (presenting studies
of Uganda and Tanzania, highlighting the problem of corruption in those countries, the
strategies adopted to fight corruption, and the role that EDI has played in assisting with the
implementation of those strategies). The EDI is the lead unit in the World Bank's anti-
corruption efforts at this writing.
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What specifically are we doing to combat corruption? Our institution
has a macroeconomic mission, and our mandate is restricted to those
specific instances of corruption that may have a significant-some
would say demonstrable-macroeconomic impact. We do not hesitate
to bring such cases to the attention of the authorities. The macroeco-
nomic nature of corruption may be identified by the large amounts in-
volved or the fear that specific cases of corruption are symptomatic of a
wider governance problem. Examples might include tax and customs
fraud with the involvement of senior public officials, the misuse of of-
ficial foreign exchange reserves, and abuses of power by bank supervi-
sors or failure on their part to take action. This has led us in some cases
to delay or suspend our support until the member in question has taken
appropriate corrective action, such as presenting external audit reports,
canceling illegal contracts, and removing or even taking legal action
against key officials found to be at the center of fraudulent practices.
68
The IMEF has begun to put its muscle where its mouth is, somewhat to
the amazement of the international borrowing community, as evidenced by
an article from The Indian Express of Bombay. It stated:
In a stunning move that should send a jolt through India's venal politi-
cal class and corrupt bureaucracy, the Intemational Monetary Fund
(IMF) has actually acted upon its recent threats to move against graft in
developing countries.... In an unprecedented move, the IMF this week
cut a $220 million loan to Kenya because of that country's refusal to
clean up pervasive bribery and self-enrichment.69
With the World Bank joining IMF, both institutions actually suspended
$292 million in loans to Kenya in 1997. As a result, Kenya's currency
plunged 18 percent as investors fled, inflation jumped and taxes had to be
raised to make up the shortfall. Basically, both IFIs finally decided that
Kenya was so corrupt that further lending to it was fruitless.
Kenya was an extreme case of corruption, but there are many more.
Only the future will tell whether IFIs have the fortitude to continue such
strong and unprecedented actions.
XII. REGIONAL DEVELOPMENT BANKS70
The Declaration of Principles of the Summit of the Americas of 1995
called upon the Organization of American States (OAS) and the Inter-
American Development Bank (IDB) to jointly assist countries implement-
68 See Michael Camdessus, The IMF and Good Governance, Address Before Transpar-
ency International (France) (Jan. 21, 1998).69 See Chidanand Rajghatta, IMF Crackdown on Corruption in Projects, INDIAN EXPRESS,
Aug. 9, 1997.
70 This section draws heavily upon information provided in The Anti-Corruption Review
published by the U.S. Department of Commerce. See Office of the Chief Counsel for Inter-
national Commerce of the U. S. Department of Commerce, The Anti-Corruption Review
(visited April 1998) <fttp:f/wwvw.ita.doc.gov/legal>. Information provided at this website is
frequently updated.
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ing their pledges of commitment to the Summit's Action Plan. The Action
Plan provides the IDB with a mandate to play a supporting role in the im-
plementation of the initiative of combating corruption. A Task Force on
Corruption and Other Financial Crimes completed the initial phase of its
work and submitted its conclusions and recommendations to integrate these
issues into the IDB's work program. Thereafter, a permanent consulting
group was appointed, headed by the Legal Department, to follow-up on the
implementation of the recommendations.
The IDB is pursuing three major lines of work identified by the Task
Force: 1) assistance to borrowing countries in their efforts to fight corrup-
tion, 2) minimizing the possibility of corruption in the use of the IDB's re-
sources in activities financed by the IDB, and 3) ensuring that there is no
corruption within the IDB itself. In addition, future plans include research
activities and the organization of three seminars during 1998 that will raise
awareness on the topics of Public Procurement, Money Laundering, and Ju-
dicial Systems Reforms.
The State and Civil Society Unit of the IDB devotes resources for
strengthening government regulatory functions and improving transparency,
responsibility and control over public service.
The African Development Bank (AFDB) has made progress on pro-
curement reform. An important component of the major reorganization of
the AFDB over the last two years included establishing a procurement unit
with accountable, operational responsibility. The procurement dispute pro-
cess, which was deeply flawed, has been radically overhauled and im-
proved. Procurement award and disbursement data has been improved and
procurement information disbursement information is included in the
AFDB's annual report. The procurement rules for goods and civil works
have been significantly upgraded and moved closer to those of the World
Bank. Use of standard bidding documents is now required. First steps have
been taken to strengthen procurement consulting rules. AFDB procurement
staff have begun to participate actively in IFI technical procurement meet-
ings.
The North American Development Bank (NADBank) has adopted a
formal anti-corruption policy. The United States and Mexico have agreed
that under the NADBank's guidelines, companies must certify that they will
not bribe foreign or domestic officials in association with any NADBank
funded project. Companies must have anti-bribery policies and state that
they have had no bribery convictions within five years of the certification.
NADBank may bar companies from future projects if it learns that they
have been convicted of bribery or if they engage in corrupt practices in a
NADBank-financed bid. Under NADBank's standard procurement poli-
cies, if the NADBank determines that a project sponsor has engaged in cor-
rupt practices in a bidding process, it may decline to finance that contract
or, if warranted, cancel that portion of the loan.
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XIV. THE OECD ANTI-BRIBERY CONVENTION
No discussion in this area would be complete without mention of the
activities of the Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development
(OECD) and its historic achievement in signing, on December 17, 1997, the
Convention on Combating Bribery of Foreign Public Officials in Interna-
tional Business Transactions.71 This instrument obligates the parties bound
to it to criminalize bribery of foreign public officials, including officials in
all branches of government, whether appointed or elected, as well as any
person exercising a public function including that of a public agency or en-
terprise.72 Most interestingly, it also criminalizes bribery of any official or
agent of a public international organization.73 Thus, it extends to the offi-
cials and staff of the IFIs themselves. This alone is a major step forward as
it will permit the IFIs to pursue prosecution of their own officials and em-
ployees if they are involved in corrupt practices. The complications of ju-
risdiction have been used to impede and delay such prosecution in the past.
The Convention requires parties to it to take necessary measures,
within the framework of their relevant laws and regulations, to prohibit the
establishment of off-the-books accounts and similar practices used to bribe
foreign public officials or to hide such bribery.74 Parties are to make brib-
ery of foreign public officials a predicate offense for purposes of money
laundering legislation on the same terms as bribery of domestic public offi-
cials.75 Jurisdiction is to be established over offenses that are committed in
whole or in part in each party's territory.76 Participating governments
pledged to work together to provide legal assistance relating to investiga-
tions and proceedings within the scope of the Convention, and to make
bribery of foreign public officials an extraditable offense.
Certainly the signing of this Convention was the major anti-corruption
achievement of 1997.
XV. WHO IS RESPONSIBLE FOR CORRUPTION?
Like the Indonesians who confronted World Bank President Wolfen-
sohn and alleged that the World Bank's failure to consider corruption in
their country made it an accomplice to corruption and consequently to the
recent financial collapse costing many Indonesians their life's savings and
their jobs, many persons accuse the IFIs of direct or indirect responsibility
for corrupt practices, especially those involving their own projects.
71 Convention on Combating Bribery of Foreign Public Officials in International Busi-
ness Transactions, Dec. 18, 1997, Organization for Economic Cooperation and Develop-
ment, 37 I.L.M. 1 (1998).
72 Id. art. 1, 37 I.L.M. at 4.731 Id. art. 1(4), 37 I.L.M. at 4.
74 Id. art. 8(1), 37 I.L.M. at 5.751 Id. art. 7, 37 I.L.M. at 5.
76 Id. art. 4(1)-(2), 37 I.L.M. at 5.
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Certainly the persons involved in corrupt acts must accept primary re-
sponsibility for them, but there are many mitigating factors. The most
popular excuse for corruption, of course, is that the salaries of public ser-
vants are too low, which forces them to become corrupt out of duty to their
families. The most believable excuse for corruption is that the opportunity
was there and the temptation was too great. It may be very hard to raise the
salaries of public servants in poor countries, but Dr. Robert Klitgaard says,
it is not very hard to eliminate opportunities to be corrupt, to reduce temp-
tations and to change incentives. According to Dr. Klitgaard, "combating
corruption.. .begins with better systems. Monopolies must be reduced or
carefully regulated. Official discretion must be clarified. Transparency
must be enhanced. The probability of being caught must increase, and the
penalties for corruption for both givers and takers must rise. 77
A very strong and practical view on the responsibility for corruption in
IFI financed projects has been voiced by Brian Cooksey, a courageous de-
velopment consultant with considerable experience in African countries,
who feels that IFIs "in general seem to have a very high tolerance for the
misuse of their money.'' He warns of the risks of the very "governance"
and "civil society" activities which are becoming increasingly popular as
"answers" to the problem of corruption in IFI financed projects.7  Com-
menting on the new IFI interest in combating corruption in the Transpar-
ency International Newsletter for June 1997, he makes some charges that
demand airing since many other development officials and consultants
agree with them strongly and know of similar cases in the countries where
they have worked. He also suggests that based on the past experience of
IFIs "there is little or no evidence that they have any idea of how to go
about the task" of combating corruption:
One of the main reasons for the disappointing performance of structural
adjustment programmes is the misuse of donor money, including sys-
tematic corruption. An extreme example is Tanzania's import support
programme, which allowed local manufacturers and traders to import
raw materials and finished goods. An increasing number of companies,
both private and parastatal, began to abuse the system. They stopped
paying counterpart funds. Import duty and sales tax were not paid on
imports. Neither the Treasury nor the commercial banks had the ad-
ministrative capacity or the integrity to handle large volumes of free
foreign exchange, but the donors ignored the problem. Only when the
scandalous behavior of the banks, the Treasury and the Minister of Fi-
See Robert Klitgaard, International Cooperation Against Corruption, FINANCE AND
DEVELOPMENT, Mar. 1998, at 4 (a quarterly publication of the International Monetary Fund
and The Word Bank).7 Brian Cooksey, Who Is Responsible for Corruption in Aid?, in TRANSPARENCY INT'L
NEWSL., June 1997 available at
<http://www.transparency.de/newsletter/NLJune97-3.html> (visited on May 18, 1998).78 id.
79 id.
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nance has r4eached epic proportions, fueling inflation and completely
derailing the budgetary process, did the World Bank and other donors
finally pull the plug on import support.
In December, 1996, the IMF started disbursing a US$240 million
enhanced structural adjustment loan, but to date not one private or
parastatal company has been put in receivership for the hundreds of
millions of donor dollars which went astray via import support. This
casual approach to large-scale corruption has been the norm among do-
nors.
Well known examples are NGOs, many of which are created with
the sole objective of embezzling donor money. Gender-related activi-
ties, youth and "informal sector" credit and job creation, and poverty
alleviation attract multimillion dollar grants for projects as "seed capi-
tal."
With the coming of political pluralism, a growing volume of aid
money has been channeled into "govemance" activities. The disad-
vantages of governance from the donor perspective are that donors
have little experience in this field, and the amounts of money which can
be disbursed, compared to the amount of administrative work involved
are relatively trivial.
Aid has served to encourage the establishment of a whole range of
corrupt activities in "civil society" to add to those which already ex-
isted in the state apparatus. Many of those managing the corruption are
recent migrants from the state sector, or straddle both public and pri-
vate sectors. The politically acceptable employment of more local per-
sonnel as desk officers has served to increase the rate of corruption.
The chances of being caught or punished are minimal. The few genu-
ine local change-agents are crowded out by the charlatans and the op-
portunists.
The imperative to disburse at all costs makes it very difficult for
donors to adequately monitor or evaluate the quality of their assistance,
since it would put the agencies in a poor light if they were seen to be
supporting non-performing or corrupt activities. Thus, as has generally
been the case, the donors pretend that their assistance is being well
used, and are evn prepared to deny well founded allegations of the mis-
use of project funds.
The continued availability of donor money is the major determinant
of the volume of aid, not performance, structural reform, or impact on
target groups. Although further project aid cannot be justified on the
basis of past performance, it continues to be a major form of aid deliv-
ery by both the World Bank and other donor agencies.
Tanzania's President Benjamin Mkapa recently published the re-
port of the "Warioba Commission" against corruption, which docu-
ments in great detail the nature and extent of corruption in Tanzania.
The picture which emerges is that of an oppressed people largely at the
Northwestern Journal of
International Law & Business 18:498 (1998)
mercy of an incompetent and corrupt state apparatus. The role of aid in
helping to create and reproduce this lamentable state of affairs is worth
exploring.
Unfortunately, the report does not mention corruption in aid.80
I have not even mentioned the issue of growing corruption within
the aid agencies themselves, particularly those in the UN system and
the European Union. If corruption has become one of the major inter-
national issues of modem times, it would hardly be surprising to find
that the virus has already infected and is spreading within the major
agencies.
If countries with ... (rampant corruption).. .can continue to enjoy
billions of dollars of aid every year, it is not because they have demon-
strated their ability to use aid wisely. But the donors are not well
placed to extol the virtues of transparency and accountability which
they do not practice themselves. To address the question of corruption
in aid, the World Bank and the other agencies will have to take a long
look at their own role in creating the problem which they now propose
to cure. "
This voice crying in the wilderness will have to be heard eventually if
the IFIs are to achieve credibility in their newfound crusade against corrup-
tion. IFIs will eventually have to accept some, perhaps much of the blame
for the corruption they now propose to fight. Even so, the time is right and
the battle must be fought.
XVI. CAN IFIS WIN THE FIGHT? WILL THEY HAVE THE WILL?
To do battle with the growing threat of globalized macronarcocyber-
corruption, 82 in the new war which has taken the place of the cold war, IFIs
will need much more gumption than they have demonstrated in the past.
They will need to clean out from their staff those officials and employees
who cannot fully bring themselves to enter the battle. Some may be "con-
scientious objectors," some may be coconspirators with the corrupt, some
may be fools, but the generals of the IFIs must have officers and soldiers
that they can rely upon to wage the war. Currently, James Wolfensohn and
Michael Camdessus and others like them are out on a limb that could well
be cut off by traitors within their own organizations.
On the other hand if the IFIs under their leadership are able to over-
come the internal and external forces waged against them and put the mus-
cle and the money of the IFIs strongly on the line, the corruption eruption
may finally be capped.
80 Emphasis added.
81 id.
82A term coined by the author to stress the broad, all encompassing, narcotics-based,
electronic money transfer-supported corruption threat to the planet.
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Michael Camdessus' closing words in Paris before Transparency Inter-
national summarize the impact the IFIs can have, if they work shoulder-to-
shoulder with member governments and civil society:
Yes, the programs are far-reaching and confirm the basic intuition of
your organization: that anyone who takes the need for transparency se-
riously will profoundly change the course of events. If you permit me
to paraphrase the words of the Duc de Liancourt, Master of the Robes
to Louis XVI, on July 14, 1789, I would say: "It's not progress, Sire,
it's a revolution!" Such reforms will require a vast change in domestic
business practices, corporate culture, and government behavior. Obvi-
ously, this will be a long-term process-a process in which the IMF,
the World Bank, and others can assist, but one whose success depends
on the efforts of the countries themselves....
"Revolution!" It is probably too strong a word. History will judge,
but for the IMF, which for fifty years confined itself essentially, in ac-
cordance with its mandate and not without some success, to helping its
member countries accept essential monetary and macroeconomic disci-
pline, these are entirely new frontiers, both vast and promising, as they
are for the World Bank and the other major international organizations.
However, we must guard against leaving this work to the international
organizations, which risks setting them up as the scapegoat for all the
world's ills if progress should come too slowly. Like all revolutions,
this one will be successful only with the unrelenting and ultimately ir-
resistible pressure of civil society. Spearheading this effort, Transpar-
ency International has already contributed to bringing about change.
The IMF is proud to work alongside Transparency International in this
vitally important effort: on it depend good governance in service of so-
ciety and the opportunity for a new form of citizenship. 3
83 See Camdessus, supra note 68.
